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Abstract
Limited research has explored the reasons behind the level of environmental concerns in master plans in China, where serious environmental degradation has caught
the world’s attention and the planning regime is significantly different from those
based on representative democracy. Analyzing eighty master plans of China’s large
municipalities, we find that the education and age of local leaders have a significant effect on environmental concerns in master plans, while their work experience and state mandate do not. We conclude that that well-educated local leaders
and a more collaborative planning approach could deal more efficiently with environmental problems in China.
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Introduction
Master plans, also called general plans or comprehensive plans, are
important documents for the future vision of local jurisdictions (Levy
2003). Environmental concerns typically refer to the awareness of environmental problems and prioritizing policies and actions to tackle
these problems. Generally, master plans that address more environmental concerns may improve local collective action in regard to ecosystem protection, climate change, and smart growth (Berke et al.
2013; Norton 2008). The extent of environmental concerns in master plans varies from place to place depending on the degree to which
the state mandates attention to environmental issues, as well as the
role played by local education level, political will, officials, and planners in the development of the master plans (Brody, Highfield, and
Carrasco 2004; Norton 2008).
Though these factors influencing master plans in North America
and Australia are well discussed in the planning literature (Berke and
Godschalk 2009; Stevens 2013; Tang and Brody 2009; Tang et al.
2011), little research has been conducted in China, where the master
planning process is different in terms of nationwide statutory requirements, powerful local leaders, party-state regime, and a planning culture dominated by modernization and physical planning (Abramson
2006; Leaf 2005; Tian and Shen 2011; Zhang 2002). In particular, the
effects of local leaders’ attributes on environmental concerns in master plans are not well explored, although some studies have found that
local leaders have a prominent role in China’s local public affairs (Li
and Zhou 2005; Zhang 2002).
In this article, we report the findings of a study that evaluates environmental concerns in 80 municipal master plans (MMPs) from China,
and explores the impacts of local leaders. The research can contribute to a body of knowledge on plan evaluation with the master plans
from China, a region not well covered by the existing plan evaluation
research. Second, the word count method we use is especially appropriate in a context in which a hierarchical administration and planning system dominates the planning process. Third, we explain factors
influencing environmental concerns in Chinese master plans, in particular, the factors from local leaders, which can give a distinctive explanation as to why some MMPs show more environmental concerns
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than the others. In doing so, we address two research questions: (1) To
what extent are environmental concerns expressed in China’s MMPs?
(2) What kinds of influence do local leaders impose on the level of environmental concerns expressed in the MMPs?
We begin by drawing on the literature to establish a theoretical
framework to explain the presence of environmental concerns in master plans and the influence of local leaders’ personal characteristics
on those concerns. Then we describe the methods used to collect and
analyze the plan quality and their influential variables. Next we present our findings and discuss the implications of the findings for promoting environmental concerns.

Literature Review
Environmental Concerns in MMPs from China
Environmental concerns generally refer to “the degree to which people are aware of problems regarding the environment and support efforts to solve them and/or indicate a willingness to contribute personally to their solution” (Dunlap and Jones 2002). Master plans are
important documents for thinking about a city in an integrated way
(Levy 2003). Therefore, it can reflect the environmental concerns of
cities— the extent to which these cities express their awareness of
environmental problems and their priority in policies and actions to
tackle these problems. They are especially important in that the scope
of master plans has expanded from land use to addressing social issues, economic needs, and environmental crises (Kaiser and Godschalk
1995). As Berke et al. (2013) recommended, it is time to incorporate
environmental thinking into comprehensive plans, but the approach
must consider different planning regimes.
Most existing frameworks of plan evaluation, covering broad issues
like environmental protection, affordable housing, climate change actions, hazard mitigation, community plans, ecosystem protection, and
smart growth, are conducted from plans in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada (Baker, Sipe, and Gleeson 2006; Berke,
Song, and Stevens 2009; Berke et al. 2013; Berke and Godschalk 2009;
Brody, Highfield, and Carrasco 2004; Lyles and Stevens 2014; Tang et
al. 2011). Plans from these countries, based on the principle of repre-
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sentative democracy, are engaged with elected officials and the general public. Therefore, comprehensive plans in these local contexts can
express openly and freely the future viewpoint and trade-off between
economic development and environmental protection (Norton 2005;
Loh and Norton 2015). Master plans in China, however, are still dominated by a hierarchical system and party-state regime, despite the
growing effects from the market and the local public. Under the institutional context, the central government sets down general goals of
economic development, social equality, and environmental protection,
and local governments cannot openly express disagreement on these
goals in their master plans, but can make implicit choices by emphasizing some goals and neglecting others.
The standard procedures of municipal master planning in China include four steps. First, once the locality has the proper permits in hand
stating its intention to do master planning, the municipal government
can offer the master planning work to a certified planning institute
through a contract or a consultancy agreement. Second, the commissioned planning institute will survey, collect data, and interview cadres from different departments and other stakeholders from the public. During the survey process, the municipal mayor organizes the
procedure and the municipal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary will attend important discussions and express his or her opinion
for the future image of the city to the planners. The institute will finish several preliminary drafts of the master plan based on “scientific”
data analysis, discussions with local cadres, and opinions of municipal leaders, while also incorporating national laws, ordinances, and
statutory technical guidance. Then planners can display the positive
and negative responses to preliminary drafts to local leaders, planning
staff, and cadres from other departments. Based on the feedback they
receive, planners will then form one single draft of the master plan. In
the process of communication and plan adjustment, local leaders play
a dominant role in directing the strategy of the final draft. Some planners even complain that during master planning “it is the local leader
doing the planning and planners doing some drawing” (Zhang 2002).
The third step is public involvement, hearings, and consultation.
The final draft must be open to the general public for their suggestions
and opinions. Meanwhile, the municipal government will also consult
experts and conduct public hearings. The planners can then adjust the
master plan according to the suggestions of the experts and the pub-
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lic. However, the effects of public involvement vary widely across cities because local governments can choose both the form that public
involvement takes and the extent to which the opinions of the public
and experts are accepted or rejected.
Later the revised version of the MMP of a large municipality (with
urban population more than one million) is submitted to the State
Council for approval.1 An expert committee led by the Ministry of
Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MHURD), the national department in charge of urban planning, and joined by fourteen other
related ministries (e.g., the Committee of Social-economic Reform
and Ministry of Environmental Protection) checks whether the MMP
complies with the state’s mandated planning goals according to laws,
ordinances, policies, and statutory guidance and standards. The approved MMP will then become a statutory plan, regulating urban development for a specified term of ten to twenty years. A final MMP
is in fact a negotiated result between the state and local government and reflects preferences of local governments balancing multiple objectives of economic development, environmental protection,
and social stability.
Evaluating Environmental Concerns by Word Counting
MMPs in China reflect local preference in a different way than western plans; it is necessary to rethink a plan evaluation method suitable to the distinctive context. Until now, the most common approach
to plan evaluation content analysis is by item coding with an established framework of good plans (Berke and Godschalk 2009; Berke
et al. 2013; Brody 2003; Brody, Highfield, and Carrasco 2004; Godschalk et al. 1999; Stevens 2013; Tang and Brody 2009). The plan evaluation process of item coding generally includes developing a conceptual framework, constructing a protocol of items, coding items by a
single or multiple trained coders, and checking the reliability and validity of results (Berke and Godschalk 2009; Lyles and Stevens 2014;
Stevens 2013). Though the item coding approach holds a potential in
evaluating plans beyond North America and Europe, Counting Word
Frequency (CWF) can be a reliable approach, with three advantages
to measure the environmental concerns of MMPs in China.
First, the CWF method, based on a naïve Bayes assumption in content analysis that “a text is represented as vector of word counts or
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occurrence” (Slapin and Proksch 2008), has been commonly used in
content analysis in political science, public management, and, to a
less extent, of urban planning (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Klüver
2013; Quinn et al. 2010). Though having poor performance in flexibility and complexity, CWF approach, with the help of computer aided
program, can reduce the likelihood of human error and personal bias
associated with code noting (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Moreover,
in case of using CWF for English text, it is necessary to simplify the
vocabulary with stemming, which reduces the complexity by mapping
words that refer to the same basic concept to a single root. In Chinese,
however, there are no separate singular and plural forms for nouns,
no verb conjugation to denote sense or match with the corresponding
subject. For example, family, families, and familial all use the same
word of jiating (family) in Chinese. Therefore, the stemming work for
Chinese texts can be much easier than that for English texts.
Second, MMPs in China reflect local preference in an implicit approach. As previously mentioned, the central government sets down
general goals of economic development, social equality, and environmental protection; local governments cannot openly express their disagreement on these goals but can make a choice among them, emphasizing some goals and neglecting others. As for the words and
expression on environmental concerns, few plans use these environment- related words with negative expression, such as “a municipality should neglect the environment, environmental protection, and
climate change.” For instance, a municipality prioritizing economic
growth even at the expense of the environmental degradation will not
express its idea in plans with a phrase such as “strengthen the economic growth and disregard environmental protection” but replace it
with “strengthen the economic growth” and mention no ideas on environmental protection. Thus, the frequency of words in a certain domain can reveal the extent to which a municipality prioritizes the issue. The approach of measuring the level of policy priority through
the number or relative proportion of documents or terms on different issues is commonly used in studies of environmental issues in an
authoritarian political setting (Huang et al. 2010). The reluctance to
use a negative expression on environment-related words partly relieve the problem of the different meaning a word might have within
another text in MMPs.
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Third, China’s MMPs are very standardized in their structure of
drafts, and similar in language style. MHURD issues a series of guidelines and requirements for drafting urban and rural plans. These
guidelines regulate the structures and styles that the text of master
plans in China should obey. Moreover, planners making MMPs in China
are required to pass the Chinese Registered Planner (CRR) certification exam, the only nationwide, official verification of planners’ qualifications in China. Once passed, they also need to complete several
training courses required in each year for CRR certification maintenance. The China Association of City Planning led by the MHURD is in
charge of both the CRR exam and the subsequent training programs,
assuring that all registered planners are familiar with the guidelines
and requirements for drafting master plans.
Both the standardized form and the reluctance to use negative expression can make CWF a suitable method to measure the environmental concerns in China’s MMPs. But it should also be mentioned that all
languages are complex. There is no exception for Chinese language.
The CWF method will not eliminate the need for careful thought by researchers nor remove the necessity of reading texts. Therefore, it is also
necessary to supplement the CWF method with careful human reading,
and confirm their results with the common approach of item coding.
Local Leaders’ Effects on Environmental Concerns in China
Early plan evaluation research discussed methods to evaluate the differences in the quality of plans, but more recent studies focus on factors that explain these differences. They broadly include planning contexts (e.g., population, wealth, education; Berke 1996; Brody, Carrasco,
and Highfield 2006; Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003; Stevens 2013;
Tang et al. 2010), local jurisdictions (e.g., local political supports, the
values and preferences of decision makers, statutory obligations, and
interplay with higher levels of governance; Berke 1996; Betsill 2001;
Burby and Dalton 1994; Burby and May 1998; Tang et al. 2010; Urwin
and Jordan 2008), planning agencies and planners (Burby and May
1998; Loh and Norton 2015; Tang and Brody 2009), and public participation (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003).
Among these four explanations, planning scholars have consistently
stressed the dominant role of decision makers on the policy focus of
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local plans (Betsill 2001; Burby and May 1998; Tang et al. 2010). The
difference in their awareness of, commitment to deal with, and capacity to solve issues may lead to differences in the policy focus of
local plans (Burby and May 1998; Norton 2005; Tang et al. 2010).
However, many of these debates on the role of decision makers (e.g.,
mayors) on local plans are based on a North American or European
context, where local regimes are based on representative democracy.
Although the policy focus may not entirely reflect the preference of
the general public, the policy preference in a local representative government should align with the public preference as closely as possible (Loh and Norton 2015).
Local governments in China differ from those of North America
and Europe in their accountability and commitment. Effects of local
leaders in China are also distinctive from their counterparts in North
America or Europe. The state exerts more influence on public affairs,
and local officers are more accountable to the Central Government
than to the local public (Abramson 2006; Zhang 2002).
Leaders in China’s municipalities answer to both the CCP secretary and the mayor, which reflects the dual presence of the communist party and administrative government (Li and Zhou 2005; Zheng
et al. 2014). Despite being equal in rank within the hierarchy partystate regime, CCP city secretaries have somewhat more authority than
the mayor according to laws that regulate the government under the
leadership of the CCP. In practice, CCP secretaries are mainly in charge
of personnel and political affairs, and mayors are responsible for the
administration of economic development, environmental protection,
education, and so on. Neither municipal CCP secretaries nor mayors
are directly elected by residents of the jurisdiction. Rather, they are
selected by those serving in higher tiers of government.
China’s municipal leaders are powerful and strongly influence local
public affairs (Eaton and Kostka 2014; Wu et al. 2013). Since the economic reform in 1978 and the tax sharing reform in 1994, the Central
Government has decentralized most decision making and given partial budgetary control to local governments (Li and Zhou 2005; Tsui
and Wang 2004). Moreover, local governments may also acquire extrabudgetary revenues through their monopolistic power over the land
market (Tao 2010). Municipal leaders wield significant authority and
influence over almost all major decisions in a municipality, especially

Z h a n g e t a l . i n J. o f P l a n n i n g E d u c . & R e s . 3 8 ( 2 0 1 8 )

9

those involving the appointment of sublevel officials and economic
problems (Eaton and Kostka 2014).
However, these powerful municipal leaders do not operate without
constraints. As agents of the state, municipal leaders are evaluated by
metrics and held directly accountable to higher levels of government
(Li and Zhou 2005). Since the economic reforms in 1978, the central
government has adjusted these metrics from political ideology and
loyalty to the ability to promote economic growth (Bo 1996). The effects of these changes have been shown in the literature, confirming
the positive connection between economic growth and official promotion in provincial, municipal, and township levels (Edin 2003; Martis
et al. 2000; Li and Zhou 2005). Most recently, facing severe problems
of environmental degradation along with economic growth, the Central Government has increasingly focused on environmental issues in
evaluating local leaders (Wu 2009; Ran 2013). The transition, sometimes defined as “authoritarian environmentalism,” is top–down and
rooted in the statutory power of the central state (Gilley 2012) and differs from democratic environmentalism in Western countries, which
relies more on public concerns, elections, and mobilization (List and
Sturm 2006).
However, the environment-oriented transition of the Central Government has not generally aligned with practical outcomes in localities
(Gilley 2012; Yu, Pagani, and Huang 2012). Little research has found
a positive connection between environmental protection and official
promotion (Ran 2013). On the contrary, Wu (2013) found that more
spending on environmental amenities negatively affects the promotion of prefectural-level city leaders in China. Ran (2013) attributes
the failure to the Central Government, which provides little political,
financial, and moral incentive to encourage local leaders to focus on
the long-term (e.g., environmental protection and sustainably) instead
of tangible and short-term outcomes (e.g., economic growth). However, Economy (2004) and Lo and Tang (2006) blamed local governments as the key obstacle in including environmental concerns, because of their popular pro-growth values and weak control from the
Central Government.
Further research shows that local leaders’ performance levels vary
with key attributes, including their duration, education, age, and
working experience (Eaton and Kostka 2014; Lorentzen, Landry, and
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Yasuda 2010). Among them, Eaton and Kostka (2014) found that short
duration generates significant negative effects on environmental policy implementation. Lorentzen (2010) showed that local leaders’ education, such as training abroad and training in law, can promote more
expedited implementation of environmental amenities and higher levels of environmental transparency. However, little research has explored the effects of local leaders’ attributes on environmental concerns in master plans.

Methods and Data
The first step in carrying out our study was accessing the MMPs. Given
the fact that full versions of MMPs in most of China’s large municipalities are inaccessible to the public, we collected MMPs adopted from
2000 to 2012 by direct requests to planning authorities or planning
institutes participating in master planning, by emails and phone calls.
Some of them refused to provide their plans, resulting in us collecting
80 MMPs, which accounted for 76.2 percent of the total 105 MMPs for
China’s large municipalities during this period. They covered all thirtyone provincial-level administrations in mainland China.
Then we measured the environmental concerns by CWF method,
comparing the probability of environmentally related words within
each master plan draft. We counted the occurrence of environmental-related words in master plans in three steps. First, we briefly read
all texts of master plans. Then we listed the frequency of all Chinese words in texts using Rost CM 6.0 (a software for Chinese content analysis), and excluded all conjunctions, adverbs, and adjectives
(Chinese does not have articles), as well as all words in maps, figures, and charts. The most common word used in the eighty master
plans is development (fazhan), with the frequency of 8.28 per thousand, and the frequency of the hundredth common word is 0.26 per
thousand. The average frequency of the most common one hundred
words is 1.57 per thousand, in contrast to 0.03 per thousand of the
succeeding one hundred most common words. So we just chose the
words related to environment from the one hundred most common
words, and come up with seven words, including environment (huanjing), environmental protection (huanbao), sustainable (kechixu), ecological (shengtai), carbon emission (tanpaifang), and climate change
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(qihoubianhua). The frequency of these seven common environmental-related words were summed in each plan as the variable reflecting the environmental concerns.
To confirm the reliability of the CWF method, we also employed
a correlation analysis between the result of environmental concerns
from word counting and that of the common approach of item noting
in plan quality research. The protocol for item noting takes in part
upon the common seven dimensions of plan quality developed by Godschalk et al. (1999), as well as the framework of direction and action
recently developed by Berke et al. (2013). Since this study focuses on
the environmental concerns as a whole, rather than individual dimensions of plan quality, we regard the fact base as awareness for environmental issues and combine dimensions of goal, policies, implementation, and monitoring and coordination as one reflecting the willingness
and supports to improve environment. Each item of the protocol was
established by the authors and two research assistants with consensus on score assignments after coding five master plans other than
those under study. Each item was scored on a 0 or 1. 1 means that the
indicator was included, and 0 means not. The protocol originally contained sixty items. After coding all eighty master plans under study,
six items were excluded because their intercoder reliability was less
than 80 percent, a standard that most existing plan quality studies
meet (Berke and Godschalk 2009).
Because master plans differ in both their length and number of
environmentally related words, we employed a logistic model for
grouped data to analyze the possible effects on environmental concerns using Stata 12.0. Each draft of the master plan is regarded as a
group, within which each word is defined as environmentally related
(coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Then the effects on the probability
of environmentally related words occurring could be explored by the
logit model, which produces maximum-likelihood logit estimates on
grouped data (Hamilton 2013; Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant
2013; Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt 2004).
We analyzed these variables on environmental concerns in two
stages. First, variables of local leaders’ attributes, planning consultants and public participation, were separately examined with logit
regression. Then in the second stage, we combined all three groups
of variables into one model and confirmed variables being statistically significant.
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Attributes of Local Leaders
As we discussed above, both the mayor and CCP secretary have predominant effects in the process of master planning. Their effects on
environmental concerns in finalized master plans possibly differ according to their age, education, and working experience, as has been
identified in studies of environmental policy implementation and environmental transparency (Eaton and Kostka 2014; Lorentzen 2010).
Therefore, we chose age, education level, major and working experience of both CCP city secretary and mayor as variables possibly affecting environmental concerns in a master plan (as Table 1 shows).
We first divided local leaders into three age groups of young (forties), middle (fifties), and aged (sixties) based on their age when plans
are made, because fifty and sixty are important age points for higherlevel governments to promote local leaders. Second, education level of
local leaders was classified into three levels: high level refers to these
officers with a full-time master’s degree or a bachelor’s degree from
China’s top thirty-nine universities.2 Middle level refers to those with a
full-time bachelor’s degree from a university other than the top thirtynine universities. Low are those without a full-time bachelor’s degree.
We posit that the education level of local leaders may have a positive
effect on environmental concerns. Another variable reflecting education of local leaders is whether or not their major is related to the environment. Training in environmentally related fields provides local
leaders more professional skills and knowledge, which could possibly promote environmental concerns in master plans. The last variable on the personal characteristics of local leaders is whether or not
their working experience is related to the environment. It is possible that an officer with environmentally related working experience
would be more concerned about environmental issues. The personal
information of city leaders was collected from the website of Baidu
Baike, which provides both the curriculum vitae of local leaders who
have been appointed since the late 1990s and their links with the official website of city governments.3
City Context
The variables of city context control for the possible impacts of the
general socioeconomic background on local environmental concerns
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Table 1. Variable Definition and Summary Statistics.
Variable
Definition and Data Source
Mean
Standard
			Deviation
Dependent variable: environmental concerns
Words for environment
The number of words related on environmenta
Words in plans
Total number of words in each master plana
City context
Regions located
Region locatedb
Eastern
Cities in the eastern region (1=yes, 0=no)
Central
Cities in the central region (1=yes, 0=no)
Western
Cities in the western region (1=yes, 0=no)
Northeastern
Cities in the northeastern region (1=yes, 0=no)
Political status
Administration level (1=provincial, vice-provincial cities, and
provincial capital, 0=prefectural level)b
Wealth
GDP per capita (unit: CNY)b
Education
Rank of the percentage of high education (from 1 to 80)
Industrial structure
Time
Planning consultant
Public participation
Plan exhibition
Reply public online
Leader’s attributes
Age_M
60s
50s
40s
Age_S
60s
50s
40s
Education_M
High
Middle
Low
Education_S
High
Middle
Low
Major_ M
Major_S
Work Experience_M
Work Experience_S

The share of secondary industryb
Plans issued after 2007 (yes=1, no=0)a
National planning institute=1, local institute=0a
With a plans exhibition hall (yes=1, no=0)c
Reply to public suggestions and communication on master
plans online (yes=1, no=0)c

245.83
4,8811.06

105.31
1,5187.85

0.46
0.20
0.20
0.14
0.425

0.502
0.403
0.403
0.347
0.497

26,462
40.50

15,644
23.24

47.77
0.72
0.44

10.780
0.454
0.499

0.42
0.62

0.497
0.488

Age group mayor belongs tod
Mayors aged 60-69 (yes=1, no=0)
0.13
Mayors aged 50-59 (yes=1, no=0)
0.54
Mayors aged 40-49 (yes=1, no=0)
0.33
Age group CCP secretary belongs tod
CCP secretary aged 60-69 (yes=1, no=0)
0.13
CCP secretary aged 50-59 (yes=1, no=0)
0.68
CCP secretary aged 40-49 (yes=1, no=0)
0.18
The education level of the mayord
With a master’s degree or bachelor’s degree from one of
0.39
the top 39 universities (yes=1, no=0)
With bachelor’s degree from non-top universities (yes=1, no=0)
0.40
Without a bachelor’s degree (yes=1, no=0) 0.20 0.406
The education level of the CCP secretaryd
With master’s degree or bachelor’s degree from a top university
0.45
(yes=1, no=0)
With a bachelor’s degree from a non-top university (yes=1, no=0)
0.45
Without a bachelor’s degree (yes=1, no=0)
0.11
Mayor with degree related to environment (1=yes, 0=no)d
0.385
CCP secretaries with degree related to environment (1=yes, 0=no)d
0.45
Mayor with environmental working experience (1=yes, 0=no)d
0.167
CCP secretaries with environmental working experience (1=yes, 0=no)d 0.05

0.336
0.502
0.474
0.336
0.470
0.386
0.493
0.493

0.500
0.500
0.309
0.490
0.500
0.375
0.222

Note: GDP = gross domestic product; CNY = Chinese yuan; CCP = Chinese Communist Party.
a. Data based on the content analysis of master plans by research team.
b. Data from the China City Statistical Yearbook from 2001 to 2013.
c. Data collected from websites of planning authorities of 80 large municipalities under the study in 2014.
d. Data collected from the website of Baidu Baike http://baike.baidu.com and websites of city governments of 80 large
municipalities under the study in 2014.
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in master plans. In this study, city context variables are wealth, education, scales, industrial structure, and the time being adopted. All city
context data, except for the time, are collected from the China City
Statistical Yearbook from 2001 to 2013, which, issued by the National
Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China every year, is an
authoritative data source to acquire information on the population,
economy, and education of all Chinese cities.
The wealth of a city possibly contributes to the environmental concerns in plans because with increased income, the general public concerns itself more with environmental issues (Scott and Willits 1994;
Selden and Song 1995). In addition, wealthier cities have more financial, human, and technical resources, which could also contribute to
high-quality plans reflecting more environmental concerns (Tang et al.
2010). Finally, wealthy cities in China face less pressure on economic
growth in the race for GDP, and, as a result, can possibly lead to a relatively high environmental priority in their master plans. Therefore, we
measure the wealth of the eighty municipalities according to their percapita GDP value in the year when their plans were finished. The percapita GDP values in different years are all converted to that of 2000.
In addition to the wealth, municipalities with industrial structure
highly dependent on secondary industry can also lead to more attention on environmental concerns in their master plans. The reason is
that these municipalities confront more pollution due to the heavy
weight of the secondary industry (Shen 2006), and the national transfer to environmental priority promoted by the central government
forces cities with serious environmental degradation to be more responsible for environmental degradation, no matter if they prefer or
not (Gilley 2012; Ran 2013). We measure the industrial structure by
the GDP share of the secondary industry.
Education is the third city context variable that can influence environmental concerns in master plans. A highly educated population
may influence the planning process and encourage an increased interest in environmental concerns (Brody, Highfield, and Carrasco 2004;
Howell and Laska 1992; Tang et al. 2011). We measure the education
level by ranking incidence of highly educated people of the total population of the city in the year the plan was made.
Large municipalities in different regions may differ in policy and
cultural contexts. China divides all provinces into four regions. Cities in the Eastern region are economically well developed; the Cen-
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tral Region is considered a rapid growth area; the Western Region receives more financial support from the Central Government and the
Northeastern Region is more strongly influenced by the prior command economy.
China’s large municipalities also differ in population size (ranging
from one million to more than ten million) and administrative level
(the highest is provincial level city and the lowest is prefecture level
city) (Abramson 2006). Largescale cities or communities can potentially raise more concern about environmental issues in plans (Tang
and Brody 2009). High administrative level means the municipal leaders should comply more with the Central Government’s environmental concerns. In China, these two variables are closely intertwined,
with a larger urban population in most cases acquiring a higher administrative level. So we combine both size of urban population and
political position into a variable of scale, and code provincial-level
city, sub provincial-level, and provincial capital municipalities as 1,
and all others as 0.
Environmental concerns in MMPs may also differ because of the
time of adoption. National efforts to tackle environmental problems
have been increasing over the last two decades, particularly after
2007, when a cabinet-level environmental ministry was established
and environmental targets were adopted in the National 12th Five Year
Plan. As well, the law of Urban and Rural Planning, requiring more
sustainable development, was issued. We divided the MMPs into those
being issued after 2007 (code 1) or not (code 0) to check the possible
effects of increased environmental concerns from the state mandates.
Planning Consultants and Public Participation
We also have control variables for planning institutes and public
participation. There are three types of planning institutes in China
(Abramson 2006): local planning institutes subordinated to provincial and municipal governments, the national planning institute subordinated to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development,
and planning institutes at departments of universities. Because none
of our sample master plans was done by a university planning department, we divided the planning institutes as either national (coded as
1) or local (coded as 0). In general, the national planning institute has
a more highly esteemed professional reputation and better developed

Z h a n g e t a l . i n J. o f P l a n n i n g E d u c . & R e s . 3 8 ( 2 0 1 8 )

16

social networks with the Central Government, while local planning institutes take advantage of local knowledge and social networks with
local governments.
The role of public participation has been thoroughly discussed in
European and North American planning circles (Brody, Godschalk,
and Burby 2003; Berke et al. 2013; Tang et al. 2010), but it is a new
topic for China’s urban planning. Most cities began to incorporate public participation during the process of master planning by posting a
draft of the master plan either onsite or online for public suggestions
or recommendations. However, great differences still exist in practice. Some city governments exhibit draft master plans for a long time
at sites that are popularly known and easily accessed by the general
public, while others do not. Similarly, some planning staff members
in municipalities actively reply to popular opinions online, whereas
those in other municipalities do not. Therefore, we take two variables
to measure public participation in master planning. One is whether or
not the city has an accessible and fixed place to exhibit the draft plans
(coded as 1), or not (coded as 0). Another is whether planning staff
reply to general suggestions (coded as 1), or not (coded as 0) about
master plans on their official website. The information for these two
variables was collected online via the official websites of municipal
urban planning bureaus, planning exhibition halls, etc.

Results and Discussion
The results confirm that there are great differences in the degree of
environmental concern in master plans, in the degree to which large
municipalities in China express their awareness on environmental
problems and in priority on policies and actions to curb environmental problems. Table 1 shows that the mean frequencies of environmental words in master plans is 245.3 words, with a standard deviation
of 105.31. In addition, the mean length of master plans is 48,811.06
words, with a standard deviation of 15,187.85.
In a different way, item noting based on established protocol also
confirms the difference of the eighty master plans under study in environmental concerns. As Table 2 shows, the mean score from the
protocol of environmental concerns was 34.85, with a standard deviation of 4.44.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Environmental Concerns Score from Code Noting.
Variable

Number
Mean Minimum Maximum
of Items 				

Environmental concerns
Awareness
Willingness and supports

54
16
38

34.85
5.14
29.73

26
0
24

44
13
35

Standard
Deviation
4.44
3.06
2.79

Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient between the score
when environmental concerns are evaluated by item noting and the
frequency from environmental word counting. The correlation is positive and strong, with a value of 0.883, as well as being statistically
significant. Moreover, we also separately analyze the correlations between the frequency of environmentally related words and score of
awareness, and that of willingness and supports by item coding. Both
the awareness and willingness and supports are important aspects of
environmental concern. Awareness, referring to the extent to which
a municipality is aware of environmental problems, is measured by
score of fact base by item coding within MMPs. The willingness and
supports to improve the environment is measured by the score of goal,
policies, implementation, and monitoring and coordination in MMPs.
Both of the two correlations are positive, with values of 0.633 and
0.718. All results from the correlation analysis confirm the credibility
of the method that using word frequency counting evaluates environmental concerns in China’s MMPs.
Using the probability of environmentally related words, Table 4
reports the maximum likelihood estimates resulting from four logit
models. Models 1 to 3 separately explore effects from variables of local leaders’ attributes, city context, planning consultants, and public
participation. Model 4 then combines all three groups of variables.

Table 3. The Correlations Analysis between the Score from Code Noting and Frequency of
Word Counting.
Variable
Scores of environmental concerns
Scores of awareness
Scores of willingness and supports
* p < 0.1 ; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.05

Frequency of Environmentally Related Words
0.883***
0.633***
0.718***
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Table 4. Logistic Regression on Environmental Issues.
		 Model 1 		
Variable
Local leader’s attributes
Age_Mayor (reference = 60s)
50s
40s
Age_Secretary (reference = 60s)
50s
40s
Education_M (reference = low)
Middle
High
Education_S (reference = low)
Middle
High

z

Coeff.

−0.115***
−0.059**

Model 2 		

Coeff.

z

Model 3		
Coeff.

z

−0.025 					
−0.026 					

−0.083*** −0.024 					
−0.120*** −0.028 					
−0.038** −0.018 					
0.100*** −0.020 					
−0.014
0.039

−0.016 					
−0.029 					

Major_M
0.148*** −0.018					
Major_S
0.075*** −0.017 					
Work Experience_M
−0.036*
−0.021 					
Work Experiences_S
0.089*** −0.032 					
City context
Scale 			
0.188***
7.27			
Region (reference = cities in the eastern region)
Middle 			
−0.117*** −5.26 			
Western 			
0.052**
2.09 			
Northeastern 			
0.056**
2.04 			
Industrial structure 			
0.003***
3.52 			
GDP rank 			
2.21e–06**
2.03 			
Education level 			
−0.002*** −2.83 			
Time 			
−0.020
−1.12 			
Planning institute and public participation
Planning institute 					
−0.056*** −0.373
Planning exhibition					
0.058*** 3.94
Reply public online					
0.057*** 3.74
_cons
−5.224*** − 0.029 −5.653*** −66.31
−5.308*** −0.020
Prob > chi2
0.0000 		
0.0000 		
0.0000 		
Note: Coeff. = coefficient; GDP = gross domestic product.
* p < 0.10 ; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01

Model 4
Coeff.

z

−0.030
–0.039**

−1.00
−2.03

–0.110*** −1.86
–0.242*** −8.57
0.053***
0.075***

2.24
3.78

−0.009
0.137***

−0.46
4.18

0.151***
7.92
0.056***
3.17
−0.017
−0.72
0.062
1.41
0.183***

6.21

−0.029
−1.04
−0.022
−0.74
0.085***
2.64
0.002**
2.17
5.58e–06*** 4.48
–0.004** −3.94
0.017
0.89
–0.035**
−2.12
0.053***
2.91
0.049***
2.44
–5.937*** −53.50
0.0000
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Local Leaders’ Attributes
The results of models 1 and 4 indicate that the attributes of local
leaders are closely associated with environmental concerns in MMPs.
Among them, age, personal education level, and major are statistically
significant, while work experience related to the environment is not.
First, the results indicate that the age of local leaders, both mayors and CCP secretaries, connects positively to environmental concerns in MMPs. MMPs of large municipalities with local leaders aged
sixty years or older have, in general, more environmental words than
those with local leaders aged less than sixty years, and hence MMPs
with local leaders aged fifty to fifty-nine years more than those with
local leaders aged less than fifty years. The results correlate with the
argument (e.g., Li and Zhou 2005; Zheng et al. 2014) that that since
China’s cadre personnel system prefers to promote young leaders, the
aged CCP secretaries and mayors who have lost their chance for promotion can afford to be more concerned about long-term municipal
environmental issues rather than short-term economic growth.
The education of local leaders also positively correlates with environmental concerns. Both the mayors and CCP secretaries with environmentally related majors correlate positively with the degree of environmental concerns. Moreover, the education level of mayors shows
more significant positive effects than that of CCP secretaries. Models 1
and 4 indicate at a statistically significant level (p < 0.01) that highly
educated mayors show a greater concern about environmental issues
than mayors with a middle or low level of education. However, the effects of CCP secretaries’ education level are not so confirmed, giving
the result that the dummy variable of both highly educated and middle educated are not statistically significant in the separated model
1, and only the variable of the highly educated are statistically significant in combined model 4 (p < 0.01). Even so, we can say that China’s large municipalities with local leaders having higher and more
environmentally related education can positively affect environmental concerns in their MMPs.
Finally, the working experience of local leaders related to the environment contributes little to environmental concerns, as in the popular Chinese saying “The position of officers directs their thinking.”
Some local leaders may have working experience of the environment,

Z h a n g e t a l . i n J. o f P l a n n i n g E d u c . & R e s . 3 8 ( 2 0 1 8 )

20

but that does not strengthen their value toward the environment.
When they are promoted to be a mayor or CCP secretary, no difference exists between them and those without environmentally related
working experience.
City Context
Our study also identified several contextual factors influencing environmental concerns in master plans. First, the wealth of a city contributes to more environmental concerns in its master plan. The result
comes from the fact that the wealth rank of a city has a negative effect
on the degree of environmental concerns of master plans in both separate model 2 (p < 0.05) and combined model 4 (p < 0.01). The positive effect of wealthy cities to plans is as similar to that of plans from
the United States, Canada, and Australia. Another parallel result is in
the argument that education makes a difference in terms of environmental concerns in master plans. In China, the high education level
of urban residents also promotes more concern about environmental
issues, which is reflected in the master plans as well.
In addition, cities with higher shares of secondary industry also
have positive effects on environmental concerns. It is understandable
that cities with high shares of secondary industry face more challenges
in reducing environmental problems, as well as increasing pressure
from the Central Government, which has begun to prioritize national
environmental goals. Even if implementation is difficult, the fact that
the master plans have an environmental focus reflects their awareness of, and willingness to consider, potential action to address the
problem.
Finally, environmental concerns also differ slightly among regions.
Table 2 shows that there is a high probability of environmental words
in the master plans of cities in the Northeastern Regions, compared
with those from the other three regions. It is interesting to note that
cities in the Central Region, where the economy has grown fast and
environmental degradation has become more serious during the last
decade, do not include as many environmental concerns in their master plans, while cities in the Northeastern Region, where the urban
economy has increased slowly or even decayed in some cities, show
high levels of environmental concern.
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Planning Consultants and Public Participation
The results also found that planning institutes have effects on environmental concerns. Models 2 and 3 show a statistically negative effect from the national planning institute (p < 0.01). It is quite strange
that the national planning institute, with its high professional planning reputation, induces less environmental concerns than local planning institutes. One possible explanation is that the national planning
institute is much more familiar with professional guides, procedures,
and requirements for approving MMPs, and has a strong social network with the Ministry of Housing and Urban- Rural Development as
well. These two advantages may make it easier to receive approval
from the Central Government on an MMP with less environmental
concerns. Another possible reason is that local planning institutes, familiar with local knowledge, have more awareness about local environmental challenges and express them more in MMPs.
Public participation also has some positive effects on the environmental policy focus in MMPs. First, the cities with stable plan exhibition places accessible to the general public promote more environmental concerns in MMPs. The result is statistically significant in both
separate model 3 (p < 0.01) and combined model 4 (p < 0.01). In addition, the positive effects of the variable on reply public online are
also statistically significant in both model 3 (p < 0.01) and model 4 (p
< 0.05). The two results confirm that a municipality in which planning staff actively reply to the public online or display more information on site can increase the extent to which environmental concerns
are expressed in master plans.

Conclusion
This study answers the question of the extent to which environmental concerns are expressed in China’s MMPs, in the case of eighty large
municipalities, and the question of what kinds of influence local leaders impose on the level of environmental concerns. The two questions
are significant in understanding the planning process and accountability of local governments in systems that are different from those based
on representative democracy in Europe and North America. Moreover,
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we focused on environmental concerns because the environment has
become an issue of note for both China’s Central Government and
the general public. To what extent the environmental concerns were
combined in master plans could extensively reflect the roles of the local leaders, Central Government, general public, and planners in the
planning process and planning outcomes under certain city contexts.
We evaluated environmental concerns in MMPs with CWF method.
The result shows that environmental concerns are differently addressed in MMPs of China’s large municipalities. We also confirmed
the result by correlation analysis with that of item coding, the common approach to plan evaluation. The positive and statistically significant correlations confirm the potential of the CWF method, being
used in plan evaluation within the institutional context of the hierarchy planning system, party-state regime, and the standardized form
of master plans.
We also found that personal characteristics of local leaders, the CCP
city secretary and the mayor, do affect the level of environmental concerns expressed in master plans based on a logit regression for eighty
master plans. Among these personal attributes, their education and
age generally play a positive role in environmental concerns. In addition, there are no obvious effects from their working experience. The
reason for the positive effect of age may be partially explained by the
existing cadre evaluation system, where aged local leaders, with less
chances for promotion, could pursue more long-term environmental
concerns instead of the short-term objective like economic growth.
While higher education and environmentally related majors improve
local leaders’ environmental values, which become infused into the
planning process.
Moreover, we identified positive effects of contextual variables like
wealth, general education level, and public participation. These results are similar to that of cities in Europe and North America. While
it is quite interesting that in some countries based on representative
democracy, state mandates on the environment have an obvious effect on environmental concerns (Berke 2009; Berke and French 1994;
Tang et al. 2011), in China, a country with strict hierarchal administrative structures, the increasing central mandates on environment
are not reflected in the MMPs of large municipalities. Explaining this
deviation is difficult, but it shows that the existing planning system
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in China is far from the ideal hierarchal structure, and local governments in reality hold more autonomy in local plans. To improve the
environmental focus in MMPs, a more collaborative approach should
replace these top–down and coercive mandates.
Our study also suggests that improving environmental concerns in
plans may reflect various strategies under different local regimes. For
China’s large municipalities, more environmentally related training
could cause considerable effects on promoting environmental concerns
in MMPs. Also the existing cadre evaluation system, which prefers
young officers, should be readjusted to reduce local leaders’ incentives to implement short-term metrics.
However, our research does not explore the processes by which
these local leaders exert their personal influence on MMPs through
planning institutes and planners. Also our study is limited in that we
did not consider the role of public servants and managers in the planning bureaus, important agents who connect local leaders, the general
public, and local knowledge with planning institutes and planners, because the personal information of the managers and staff members
of planning bureaus in most large municipalities, unlike these local
leaders, are inaccessible to the public. Therefore, further studies on
the master plan making process by case study could deepen our understanding of how these mayors and CCP secretaries influence master plans through communication with planning staff members, planning institutes and planners, or vice versa.
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Notes
1. A municipality with urban population less than one million just needs an approval
from its provincial government.
2. Though there are no official or authorized university ranking so far in China, a
group of thirty-nine universities have good academic and educational reputation,
and are sponsored with the “project 985” funding (top university funding ) by the
Ministry of Education of China.
3. The website of Baidu Baike provides both the curriculum vitae of all precedent
and current local leaders of large municipalities since 1990s and their links with
the official website of city governments. We collected data of local leaders between July and September 2014 in two steps: the first is to enter “the name of
city” + “mayor (or party secretary)” in Baidu Baike and collect attributes of local
leaders used in this study, the second is to check the information with those provided by the official website of city governments.
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